CS and Econ at Cornell: Day II
- Avrim Blum spoke about potential games, and cost of uncertainty. His talk reminded you the CS art of problem formulation which I think of as one of our contributions to the world. Yoav Shahom argued against addiction to equilibrium. He seemed like one who can research or play or combine both and he did. He spoke about equilibrium of strategies in computational games and demo-ed his winning software for pool! Bill Sandholm spoke about population games where the number of players is large and evolutionary game theory kicks in. David Parkes spoke about cases like dynamic auctions where you can't go for strategyproof and optimality directly, but proposed starting with heuristic mechanisms and tweaking them. Dirk Bergemann spoke about modeling and tradeoff of targeting. Michael Schwarz spoke about finding stable matches in which people are matched to the median partners in utility. Fun stuff with the stable matching lattice.
- Lance Fortnow gave a quintessential theory talk, formulating computational time creatively as discounted utility in two party games and other similar problems. Costas Daskalakis gave a great talk, neatly laying out the hardness of general games against zero-sum games and sketched out some special cases which may be easier. His talk drew a lot of discussion from Economics, mainly wondering what the hardness of these models meant for real behavior of agents. PPAD met milk price at Walmart.